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Humankind is confronted with a “nuclear stewardship curse”, facing the prospect of needing to
manage nuclear products over long time scales in the face of the short-time scales of human polities.
I propose a super Manhattan-type effort to rejuvenate the nuclear energy industry to overcome the
current dead-end in which it finds itself, and by force, humankind has trapped itself in. A 1% GDP
investment over a decade in the main nuclear countries could boost economic growth with a focus
on the real world, epitomised by nuclear physics/chemistry/engineering/economics with well defined
targets. By investing vigorously to obtain scientific and technological breakthroughs, we can create
the spring of a world economic rebound based on new ways of exploiting nuclear energy, both more
safely and more durably.
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I. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM: SOCIETAL RISK AND NUCLEAR ENERGY HAZARD
Human development of nuclear materials for civil (as well as military) uses has created a singular situation. Here
the term “singular” is taken in the strong sense of a unique situation with no equivalent, ever. The singular situation
is that humankind has put on herself the task of husbandry of nuclear materials and of the waste of civil and military
uses for centuries, tens of millennia and up to millions of years, depending on the nature of the radioactive elements.
Indeed, by-products of a reactor last for hundred years (e.g. Cesium-137 with a half-life of 30 years) to hundreds of
thousand of years or even millions of years (Plutonium-239 with a half life of 24’000 years to Technetium-99 with the
largest fission product yield of 6% for thermal neutron fission of Uranium-235 among long-lived fission products with
a half life of 211’000 years).
Consider that these time scales, during which humankind needs to babysit these nuclear residues, are comparable
to, or larger than, that of the lifetime of the human species ‘homo sapiens’, usually dated to have emerged in his
modern anatomical form about two hundred thousands years ago! It is essential for the biosphere, and in particular
for human health, that the artificially concentrated and man-made nuclear materials are not entering the biological
cycles. The singularity of centuries, tens of millennia to the million-year time scales of required human management
stands in stark contrast with all other activities involving time scales of decades to centuries – at most, even in the
worst chemical pollution cases. Even the long time scales involved in global climate change are dwarfed by those
resulting from human nuclear activities.
It is thus essential to frame the issue of nuclear energy within the dynamic context of society. Human societies are
in continuous evolution, formation, aggregation, fusion, consolidation, disaggregation, collapses and so on. Human
societies are punctuated by transitions taking the form of revolutions, civil wars, conflicts, ethnic collisions and
instabilities (Cederman et al., 2013). The typical time scales of human societies are decades to centuries, at best
(Turchin, 2003; Diamond, 2011; Fukuyama, 2014). No empire, nation or society has ever been stable and without
major conflicts over time scales of more than a few decades. Even the most stable society evolves. And a large body
of evidence shows that these evolutions often occur abruptly rather than through smooth transitions (Scheffer, 2009).
In other words, a large body of works on comparative history (Diamond and Robinson, 2011) and, more recently, on
geopolitical dynamics, show that human societies are not stable but are prone to crises and sudden mutations.
Think of the crisis in Europe in the early 1990s, leading to the breakup of Yugoslavia following a series of political
upheavals and inter-ethnic Yugoslav wars affecting primarily Bosnia and Croatia. Consider the so-called Arab Spring
started in December 2010, that destabilised regimes that had been stable for decades – such as Tunisia, Egypt,
Libya, Mali, Syria and Yemen – and with major protests in a host of other Arab countries. Reflect on the situation
in Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Thailand, in many African countries and in South America; the political and social
world is very far from stable, even on a time scale of years to decades. And what about the growing inequalities in
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2the Western world in the last decades characterised by a progressive but steady impoverishment of the bottom 99%
of the population (Piketty, 2014), which may breed again new large scale instabilities with uncertain and perhaps
extraordinary consequences?
Humankind is thus faced with the problem of managing sensitive man-created wastes over much longer time scales
than the lifetime of ephemeral human polities. In fact, the development of nuclear energy has been based on an
implicit formidable bet that human societies will be sufficiently stable, solid, and reliable to put nuclear husbandry
at a suitable priority level, and at all times, in order to avoid catastrophic singular events or a progressive alienation
of our biosphere. Nuclear energy is a recent phenomenon, whose development covers no more than the last 60 years
or so. In this time, the major powers have been on the brink of total mutual destruction during the Cold War.
Many argue that the military nuclear threat has been the very engine of stability in the Western world, following
two debilitating (except for the US) world wars. But what about the more than 140 countries on this planet that
are deemed non-democratic and exhibit various levels of potential or rampant instabilities? And, when examined
from a historical perspective, it may be no less than a heroic claim that societies that are now seen as stable will not
transform into locii of instability.
According to another narrative, the end of WWII, followed by the bipolar world order organised around the two
superpowers resulting in the Cold War, led to an illusion of stability – a dream that social and political systems have
evolved towards higher levels that could ensure better outcomes to resolve human conflicts. However, History suggests
that betting on human peace and stability may be dangerous. Perhaps, the situation is becoming even more uncertain,
with the progressive transition to a new regime where scarcity of natural resources and essential commodities and the
competition for vital space will shape the new densely populated world order.
How is it possible to ensure that teams of skilled technicians will dutifully continue their routine maintenance of
key nuclear facilities and waste storage sites in the presence of a local revolution, conflict or war threatening their
families? What if Saddam Hussein, exasperated after losing power, had a nuclear power plant (NPP) to make critical
(by simply destroying or incapacitating the cooling systems), rather than burning oil fields? Even worse, in the
event of severe conflicts between nations, NPP and other critical infrastructures become prime targets in the goal
of crippling the enemy. As a recent vivid illustration, during the Ukrainian civil war, there was active social media
activity concerning the calls to attack the Zaropozhskay NPP (the largest NPP in Europe and the fifth largest in
the world), which is 200 km from the war zone. In February 2014, operatives of the Right Sector were arrested by
guards of NPP when trying to infiltrate them, forcing NATO nuclear specialists to check that all Ukrainian NPPs
have adequate protection measures.
Another dimension of the singularity of nuclear energy is the extraordinarily large impact that a single accident can
have at the worldwide level. There are currently more than 440 nuclear reactors in operation and more than 60 under
construction worldwide. For all, one cannot exclude the possibility of another accident involving a partial meltdown of
the reactor of a large NPP, with a significant fraction (say 5% to 20%) of the reactor contaminating the atmosphere,
ocean and/or Earth soil. Our estimates show that just one event has global measurable consequences (Sornette et al.,
2013; Wheatley et al., 2015). Supposedly impossible scenarios (according to industry-standard Probabilistic Safety
Analysis risk estimates) such as Chernobyl and Fukushima (Kro¨ger and Sornette, 2013) can be taken as the basis to
imagine others, whose impact would be in the range of tens of trillions (of dollars, euros, Swiss francs...) with lasting
consequences in the form of major zones of uninhabitability (Sornette et al., 2013; Wheatley et al., 2015). Think for
instance of the real-estate value of New York City, USA or of Zurich, Switzerland, both of which are rather close to
an operating NPP and would become uninhabitable in exceptional and extremely unlikely – but possible – scenarios.
Hence, the management of the nuclear energy industry should be considered as a public good, where any accident
or misbehavior in one major NPP has externalities over the whole planet. Most relevant to Europe, the Chernobyl
accident had – and still has – significant environmental, health and financial implications. Furthermore, there is no
guarantee that radioactive materials will remain hermetically enclosed in the concrete sarcophagus in the future. This
is a Damocles sword hanging over the head of large European populations for many generations. Thus, even in stable
society, nuclear risk is still high (Sornette et al., 2013; Wheatley et al., 2015). The official industry and political
position is a combination of dangerously underestimating risk, and being disingenuous about it to the public. Clearly
the risk needs to be understood and publicly acknowledged before there will be public support for addressing it.
Even in supposedly stable and efficient societies, it is doubtful that we can count on the reliability of human managed
organisations to ensure a safe nuclear stewardship. In his study of the safety of the US nuclear weapons command
organisations, Scott Sagan (1995) provided numerous examples that the organisations one may have surmised to be
those with the best safety record are in fact plagued by failures and accidents, due to political infighting, organized
deception, normalization of errors, reclassification of failure as success, and conflicts over short-term interests. In a
recent book, Eric Schlosser (2014) goes further by reporting in details on known accidents with nuclear weapons that
have been regularly taking place since 1945. Centering on the Damascus accident of 1980, an explosion in a Titan II
3Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile housed in Damascus, Schlosser documents a litany of nuclear accidents revealing
the past, present and future vulnerability of the exceedingly complicated technical systems that are nuclear weapons,
embedded within layers of bureaucracy and subjected to the continuously changing nuclear policies of the politicians.
The civil nuclear energy industry is distinct from the nuclear weapon organisations, but for our purpose they both
share a number of important characteristics: (i) they deal with the same high energy density of nuclear physics at
1 MeV; (ii) they deal with extremely complex systems, interfaced with and managed by fallible human operators
embedded in imperfect institutions; (iii) they are exposed to the changing whims of politicians, themselves reacting
to the volatile public opinions.
And there is the controversial economics of nuclear energy (see e.g. http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/
Economic-Aspects/Economics-of-Nuclear-Power and Shrader-Frechette, 2011). On March 4, 2015, the french
Areva nuclear group announced record losses of 4.8 billion euro for 2014. One may wonder whether and when cost-
cutting will impact security measures and reduction of competent personnel? Most of the 440 NPP in operation are
over 30 years old and will require increasing investment to ensure safety, not to speak of the cost of decommissioning
a NPP, which may turn out to be roughly on par with the cost of building it.
In the best case scenario (in the absence of conflict and regime change), according to a detailed statistical study
of the most complete available database that is 75 percent larger than the previous best dataset on nuclear incidents
and accidents, Wheatley et al. (2015) found that we still have a a 50% chance that, in terms of costs, (i) a Fukushima
event (or larger) occurs in the next 50 years, (ii) a Chernobyl event (or larger) occurs in the next 27 years and (iii)
a TMI event (or larger) occurs in the next 12 years. The figure provides a precise statistical quantification of these
statements. This suggests an intrinsic instability of the nuclear energy industry. Together with my other argument
on the instability of societies, the diagnostic is inescapable: an unstable industry in an unstable world.
I then ask how can the reliable management of nuclear risks be achieved over the required time scales of tens of
years, hundreds of years, up to millions of years, given the fundamental unstable nature of human societies and polities
(Sornette and Cauwels, 2015). I contend that these simple facts (long time scales of needed nuclear stewardship,
short-time scales of human polities and fallibility of technical human organisations) when put together, lead to a deep
reassessment of humankind’s choices with respect to the nuclear industry.
II. PROPOSED SOLUTION AND ACTION: CALL FOR A SUPER MANHATTAN-TYPE EFFORT IN
NUCLEAR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING
This communication is not a call to stop the development and use of nuclear energy. In view of the diagnostics of
the previous section of our stewardship curse, I conclude that there is no way to turn back, given the existing millions
of tons of radioactive substances (with a complex hierarchy of radioactivity levels and lifetimes) that have already
been created by the half-century operation of hundreds of NPP (in addition to military grade substances). It is not
like we could vote ourselves out of the problem by choosing to get out of nuclear energy, as naively proposed by some
green advocates, policy makers and governments. This is simply impossible as the unnaturally concentrated nuclear
material (in wastes and NPP) is with us for up to millions of years. Phasing out nuclear energy will not make the
nuclear wastes, and the radioactive elements associated with the decommissioning of the NPP, disappear.
Given the highly unstable nature of human societies, I conclude that it is simply irresponsible to depend on the
reliability of human management of these delicate infrastructures and wastes in the long and very long terms. What
are the alternatives? My proposal is straightforward and probably will be called naive and unrealistic by many: let us
get rid of the wastes, of the past, present and as it is generated. This is the only logical way to address the dual problem
of the unreliability of human management and the presence of critically dangerous long-lived wastes. This requires
directly attacking the key social problems confronting nuclear power, which are poor economics, the possibility of
catastrophic accidents, radioactive waste production, and linkage to nuclear weapon proliferation (Ramana and Mian,
2014). By making clean civil nuclear energy a priority, we ensure the necessary development and sustainability of the
technological and human skills. In contrast, phasing out civil nuclear energy leads to the enormous risk of losing the
critical human competence to ensure the long-term stewardship of the mountains of nuclear wastes, in a society that
would inherit a costly legacy of previous mistaken policies and would no more be committed to this energy source.
Nuclear energy is a fact of Nature. We can ignore it at the cost of a huge opportunity loss. We can mistreat it at the
cost of enormous dangers. But it is there and we have not done enough yet to master it to garner the fruits of this
amazing source of energy. Now is the time.
Achieving this goal is neither trivial, nor is success certain. But not trying would be failing to embrace the
option that can free us from the nuclear stewardship curse we put ourselves in. It requires a vigorous civil nuclear
research program to crack the waste recycling problems. I propose that governments should immediately invest large
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FIG. 1: Left panel: Left panel: Historic data (open circles) showing the US$ losses (left vertical scale) resulting from accidents,
in excess of 70 million US$, occurring at nuclear power generating facilities, between 1960 and 2014. The data is compared
with the median and quartiles of the estimated distribution of the largest extreme events, for the pre- (blue) and post- (red)
TMI (Three Mile Island accident of 1979) regimes, using methods described in (Wheatley et al., 2015). Had the distribution
not changed after TMI, we would expect the largest events (grey) to be much smaller than under the post-TMI regime. Right
panel: cumulative distribution function (right vertical scale) of the event arrival time for a Fukushima like (or larger US$
cost) event, a Chernobyl like (or larger US$ cost) event, and a TMI like (or larger US$ cost) event. The 50% arrival times are
indicated by the x. Beneath, the 25%-75% arrival interval is given for each case. This visualises the statement in the text and
further quantifies the 25%, median, and 75% quantile return times: Fukushima: 2015 + (25, 50, 225); Chernobyl: 2015 + (11,
27, 55); TMI: 2015 + (5, 12, 25). Figure prepared by S. Wheatley.
resources in nuclear physics, nuclear engineering and chemistry (1 MeV energy scale), relevant ordinary chemistry (1
eV energy scale) as well as material sciences and relevant engineering disciplines to find innovative ways of solving
the key problem of the long-lived radionuclides. I am in particular thinking of both incremental progress as well as
the development of completely novel revolutionary methods for energy-efficient transmutation with accelerators and
other novel technologies. Recall that, with large flux of neutrons, it is in principle possible to reduce the half-life of
Plutonium from 24’000 years to just one day. Accelerator driven transmutation systems have been proposed already a
long time ago (see e.g. Bowman et al., 1992) and the impact of this and other advanced waste management strategies
and closed fuel cycle partitioning and transmutation technologies on the long term radio-toxicity of stored waste
have already been the subject of numerous investigations (see e.g. Saito and Sawada, 2002; OECD Nuclear Energy
Agency, 2002; OECD NEA No. 6996, 2012; Knebel et al., 2013; Abderrahim et al., 2014). We need to build on
this existing knowledge and leverage it many times to foster major innovations necessary to make this practically
feasible and economically viable, even profitable. Further, there is a major political obstacle, which is the need for the
prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation, which was at the origin of US President Carter’s decision on April 27, 1977
to indefinitely defer the reprocessing of spent nuclear reactor fuel by so-called breeder reactors (see (Rossin, 1995) and
President Carter’s message to Congress entitled “The need to halt nuclear proliferation is one of humankind’s most
pressing challenges”). Thus, with concern to the full nuclear fuel cycle, it will be essential to work on reprocessing,
breeder reactors, nonproliferation and Plutonium honestly, openly and objectively.
5Due to the need to recycle piles of nuclear waste, we need more than just incremental improvements in Generation
IV and V reactors to achieve energy production that is more economical, safer, minimizes ard reduces waste, and
avoids proliferation. This is because of the need to recycle the piles of nuclear wastes and get rid of the stewardship
curse that we are currently in. Our present mastering of nuclear energy is still quite primitive and wasteful. We need
to develop the technologies for efficient reliable transmutation using systems that work in sub-critical and/or critical
mode, in the spirit of the intended European MYRRHA project, but many times more ambitious and faster. The
tasks are manifold, involving reactor technology for safety and efficiency, reprocessing physics and engineering, new
materials for thermal exchanges, techniques of energy production, risk mapping, and so on. This will require a strong
multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approach that brings closely together nuclear physicists, engineers, chemists,
natural and Earth scientists, economists, as well a political scientists, conflict research scientists and historians. The
quasi-abandoned nuclear physics and chemistry research fields should be rekindled in major universities worldwide.
We need a renaissance of nuclear science, with a resurrection of moribund nuclear physics departments in higher
education. The private sector has to be incentivised even further to contribute its share of funding and creativity in
the goal of using the new techno-innovations for efficient and reliable nuclear energy sources.
A major quantitative map must be developed, combining the knowledge on nuclear risks from an engineering
point of view, also taking into account the impact of natural hazards (earthquakes, tsunamis, storms, floods...) and
geopolitical and economic risks. On top of this engineering map, a major interdisciplinary effort is needed to identify
all kinds of social instabilities. A lot of data and knowledge already exist along these different dimensions but it needs
consolidation, integration and enhancement in order to become operational. By combining these different elements,
we shall obtain the first comprehensive risk map associated with nuclear materials created by humankind to better
manage in an integrative fashion the existing installations and better develop future ones.
There are a number of existing activities exploring options for transmutations in Europe and worldwide (Struwe
and Somers, 2008). These initiatives demonstrate the existence of high uncertainty with respect to a host of physical
and technical problems. Making nuclear energy clean and reliable is an inherently complex system problem, given
the multiple scales, interactions and feedback loops involved, and including the notorious human-machine interfaces
and the tendency for humans to make mistakes. Broad R&D programs are needed to invent, explore and evaluate
open material properties for the reliable operation of these complex systems. The challenges are not just technical
but also theoretical, with the need for the development of multidimensional theoretical approaches to improve the
understanding of fuel behaviour and reactor processes and to foster novel reactor designs for optimal transmutation.
Alternative technologies such as thorium-fuelled molten salt reactors need to be investigated and improved, since
thorium is about three times as abundant as uranium, does not lead to core melt down and produces less waste, with
the present designs (Tindale, 2011). Approaches such as the Electron Machine with Many Applications (EMMA)
could lead to accelerator driven subcritical reactor systems in which a non critical fission core is driven to criticality
by a small accelerator (Rose, 2011) (see also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EMMA_%28accelerator%29). In the
last few years, the nuclear industry has been advocating the ‘new’ technology of small modular reactors, on the claim
that it could overcome previous economic failures of nuclear power. However, recent studies suggest that enormous
efforts are required to reverse the severe disadvantages that small modular reactor technology may face in the future
(Ramana and Mian, 2014; Cooper, 2014). This field therefore needs more vigorous research.
III. BROADER ECONOMIC CONTEXT AND VISION
As explained in (Sornette and Cauwels, 2014), the period from 1980 to the great financial crisis starting in 2008 was
characterised by growth that was mainly catalysed by excessive unsustainable private sector debt, financial innovation
and leverage. Since 2008, and especially in Europe, one can observe sluggish growth or even stagnant economies, with
a strong concern that the growth that the West has enjoyed since the reconstruction era after WWII might be a
phenomenon of the past, given the levelling off of demographics and the slowing down of technological innovations
(Gordon, 2012). Given that the post-crisis solutions have been even more debts on the side of governments and easy
monetary policy – the very ingredients that facilitated the run-up to the crisis –, how can we get out of this “new
normal”, and face the enormous liabilities of our underfunded pension systems?
I propose a bold initiative for governments and society to invest confidently in the future with a ∼ 2% additional
GDP investment focused on energy, from nuclear energy to diluted sources such as solar, wind, geothermal, as well
as the battery storage problem and so on. Humankind’s achievements have been decided by energy. Most of human
history has been determined by human and animal energy. Then, came the industrial revolution of the eighteen
century with a transition to coal energy and then to oil energy (Yergin, 1991), and to other sources. It is often
remarked that a typical European or American household possesses more artefacts than an Egyptian pharaoh, simply
by its access to sources of high density energy. We tend to take it for granted, but our civilisation is one of dense and
6plentiful energy. We thus need to foster innovation in energy of all forms, both dense and more centralised like nuclear
energy that complement the more dilute and decentralised forms. As described above, I view the nuclear energy
challenge as preponderant, which should garner a dominant share, perhaps as much as 1% of GDP for a decade and
more.
Rather than bailing out large existing banks and giant dinosaur-like firms, we should be wiser to foster the devel-
opment of small and medium-sized firms, which are well-known to be the real creators of jobs (Wong et al., 2005; van
Praag, 2007) (while large firms are net destructors of jobs, as a result of consolidation during M&A and cost cutting).
While most of civil nuclear energy has tended to be centralised in large firms and government agencies, there is a place
for bottom-up innovations and bold initiatives, in combination with carefully thought industry-public partnerships.
This would send a strong message to the tens of millions of young people in Europe and in the US in particular that
they are encouraged and helped to innovate, to take risks and to join the dream of the previous generation of creating
a better future. This strategy would help reverse the negative sentiments that have been permeating industry and
political circles, as well as the heavy economic and psychological load carried by households, via the message of hope
and the vision of a better future. This requires explaining the importance of expectations, of self-fulfilling anticipations
and of providing the incentives to create a new real economy. There is empirical evidence that the successful future
companies are often those created during recessions and during bad times by entrepreneurs who are contrarians and
dauntless. The investments proposed by this program could help support such a recovery.
The exceptional economic and political situation in which the world, and Europe in particular, finds itself, calls
for exceptional measures and ideas. In the end, there is only one way to get out of debt and over leverage, which
is growth. Countries have rarely if ever paid off their debt, they have grown their GDP out of their debt. I mean
real growth, and not the artificial unsustainable financial based leverage that led to the 2008 banking crisis in the
US and the 2010 sovereign troubles in Europe that are still continuing and far from being resolved (Sornette and
Cauwels, 2014). There are only two ways to grow (per capita) in the real economy (as opposed to the financial virtual
economy of the past three decades before 2008), which is to create/innovate and increase productivity. This can only
be achieved by humans for humans, in the presence of the appropriate infrastructure and the right vision on great
goals. This will require special measures at the fiscal and credit levels to facilitate the drive of the energetic part of
the population, to raise its head again, take the bull by the horns, and innovate and create. More broadly, this vision
weaves with the construction of a future of new energies, of new transportation and network infrastructures, of new
cities and dwellings (better integrated with natural habitats), of new health and food industries, of new entertainment,
and so on. Special attention and processes must be put in place to include the public wellbeing at the center of the
initiative, to empower people so that they can develop trust in the specialised professions and organisations dealing
with nuclear energy for their competence and communication honesty (Greenberg et al., 2014), which has, in many
cases, arguably been badly managed: for instance, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not publish
a historical database of the events rated on the International Nuclear Event Scale, leading to a gap in the public
perception between the claimed extremely low likelihood of a core melting accident and the occurrence of several of
them already in just a few decades of nuclear history. Only then can the required effort be accepted as a policy priority
(Greenberg, 2014), not top down but bottom up, from the people, by the people, for the people. More generally,
progress in public infrastructure would help reverse the disenfranchisement that people are feeling due to government
mal investment.
As already mentioned, the investment in a vigorous civil nuclear research program should be the priority. I indicated
a rough figure of about 1% of GDP per year for a decade. How does this compare with past projects? To give a first
reference, the Manhattan project cost a total $2 Billion (which should be compared with the US 1940 GDP of $100
Billlion and 1944 GDP of 220 Billions that rose tremendously just in four years due to the WWII effort), amounting to
about US1998 $26 Billion (Schwartz, 1998) (compared to a 1998 GDP of $9’000 Billions). The Manhattan project was
thus 2% of the US 1940 GDP and 1% of US 1944 GDP (but of course spread over several years). The Apollo program
cost $30 billion in 1970s dollars, the equivalent of $110 billion in 2010. The total cost of the space senhuttle program
was estimated at close to $200 billion in 2010 dollars (http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1579/1). The US
has spent $486 billion over 57 years on human spaceflight, an average of $8.5 billion a year. A recent report prepared
by the US Congressional Research Service (Sissine, 2014) quantified that the funding in nuclear energy technology by
the US Department of Energy (DOE) summed up to 50 billion of 2013 US$ for the 37 year period from FY1978 to
FY2014.
Compared with this paltry 1.35 billion of 2013 US$ per year of spending of the US DOE, I propose a hundredfold
increase in each of the major nuclear energy countries (USA, Europe, Japan, China...). One hundred fifty billion
US$ per year seems huge, but is a tiny fraction of the bailout program launched in 2008 involving trillions of dollars
to save financial institutions during and after the financial crisis. It is also slightly less than 1% of US 2014 GDP.
One hundred and fifty billion euros is more than half the present GDP of Greece, but it amounts to just two months
7and a half of the ECB quantitative Easing program launched in March 2015 on the tune of 60 billions euros per
month to buy European sovereign bonds. Eighteen trillion Yen seem astronomical but is dwarfed by the expansion
of the Bank of Japan bond buying program at a rate of 80 trillion Yen of bonds a year, as of 31 October 2014
(https://www.boj.or.jp/en/announcements/release_2014/k141031a.pdf).
The picture is clear: to keep the status quo of the financial and economic states of their countries, present high
level officials do not hesitate to develop completely non-standard policies, whose real economic impacts are highly
controversial, promoting moral hazard, catalysing misallocations of resources, launching currency wars, increasing
inequalities and leading to a full range of unintended consequences and unknowns. These so-called “quantitative
easing” programs use the levers of finance and innovative monetary policy in the hope that this will spill-over to the
real economy and spur job recovery and real economic growth. In fact, such quantitative easing worsens inequality,
thus making social instability more likely, exacerbating the precariousness of civil nuclear energy. In contrast, my
proposition targets the real world directly, epitomised by nuclear physics/chemistry/engineering with well defined
targets. By investing vigorously to obtain scientific and technological breakthroughs, we create the spring of a world
economic rebound based on new ways of exploiting nuclear energy as well as all other possible energy sources, both
more safely and more durably (Kovalenko and Sornette, 2013).
A big part of my proposed program includes a new system of incentives to attract the best minds to the civil nuclear
research and industry renaissance. It has been well publicised that the past 50 years have seen an almost doubling
of the income of people employed in the banking and financial industry compared with people employed in other
industries, with the same level and sophistication of education. As a professor of finance (but also of Physics, of Earth
Sciences, of Complex Systems and of Entrepreneurial Risks) at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich
(ETH Zurich), I witness daily the dramatic attraction that finance has on some of my best students, lured by the
great technical challenges, high degree of innovation, glittering jobs and high incomes. While financial innovation is
necessary to solve funding problems for the development of new technologies (Janeway, 2012), it is not the solution for
our real concrete problems and hopes in the real economy, namely sustainability with respect to water, food, energy,
access to new horizons of entertainments and technology, and the pursuit of happiness. Thus, we need strong policies
to reverse the wrong incentives that attract the best minds to Wall Street and to redirect them to the real challenges,
in particular of nuclear science and technology. This requires a revamping of the salary and funding system, starting
with departments of top universities to the development of proper stimuli in the industry. Let us attack courageously
the misaligned incentives that have created so many moral hazards and misallocation of resources and talents to focus
on the great challenges of our time.
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